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FIDUCIARY DUTY OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

Personal representatives are frequently given, by the decedent, a power of sale over the estate property without court
authority. This power is a trust power not to be exercised with
arbitrary discretion or for the benefit of the personal representative. 39 It has often been recognized that the personal representative must act not only with good faith in the exercise of
this power, but also with loyalty to the beneficiaries of this
power." In re Estate of Meister" presented the question of
when a personal representative may be surcharged for negligent exercise of his duty. The personal representative was
charged with negligent management and sale of the decedent's
Wisconsin real estate, all of which was income producing.
The court made clear that mere negligence on the part of
the personal representative will not expose him to personal
liability unless the beneficiaries prove a harm to the estate, i.e.,
either a loss in value of the estate property or loss of anticipated
profit by retaining the property. Most importantly, the court
voted that there could be no surchargeable loss if at the time
estate property was sold the sale was necessary for liquidity
purposes. This was precisely the situation in the case where the
evidence indicated that the decedent's real estate comprised
eighty percent of the estate's assets while the estate's cash
requirements equaled two-thirds of this amount.
JOHN L. SCHLIESMANN

TORTS
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The supreme court issued several significant opinions in the
area of products liability during its 1975 term. In Greiten v. La
Dow' the court once again attempted to isolate and clarify the
requirements for a cause of action sounding in negligence as
39. Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis. 2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966).
40. Estate of Van Epps, 40 Wis. 2d 139, 161 N.W.2d 278 (1968); McKeigue v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 130 Wis. 543, 110 N.W. 384 (1907).
41. 71 Wis. 2d 581, 239 N.W.2d 52 (1976).
1. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
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opposed to a cause of action based on the theory of strict liability. The plaintiff in the Greiten case was injured while working
with a printing press. He commenced an action against the
manufacturer of the printing press, alleging that the defendant
manufacturer had breached its common law duty to design the
machine without defects. The plaintiff did not attempt to bring
a cause of action based on the theory of strict liability. The
defendant's product was never specifically alleged to be "unreasonably dangerous," nor was there any evidence introduced
at the trial which was intended to prove that the printing press
was unreasonably dangerous. Instead, the plaintiff simply alleged "that the defendant was careless and negligent in the
design and manufacturer of the machine and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and of the plaintiff's injuries." '
The court was directly confronted with the issue of whether
a plaintiff must specifically plead and prove that a product
contained a defect which rendered it "unreasonably dangerous" before he can recover damages for "breach of duty to
design without defect." 3 A majority of the court4 determined
that a plaintiff does not need to prove that a defective product
is unreasonably dangerous to users or consumers when the
cause of action is based on common-law negligence.
Three members of the court believed that the opposite conclusion had been reached a year earlier in the case of Vincer v.
Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co. 5 In that
case the court held that "even under negligence law, the plaintiff still must prove that the product causing injury was
dangerous and defective."' In Greiten the majority opinion
conspicuously neglected to mention the Vincer case. However,
in a later case, Howes v. Deere & Co.7 the court recognized that
"[iut may be that some of the difficulty in distinguishing between the elements encompassed in the common-law negli2. Id. at 599, 235 N.W.2d at 683.
3. For a discussion of the duty to design without defect, see Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of Products, 71 YALs L.J. 816 (1962).
4. The majority opinion was mistakenly identified as the minority opinion, while
the minority opinion was mislabeled as the majority opinion. This error was recognized
and corrected in the case of Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d
76, 80 (1976).
5. 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
6. Id. at 330, 230 N.W.2d at 797.
7. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
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gence rule and the negligence per se doctrine are attributable
to the opinions of this court."' After making this observation,
the court declared that the above-quoted statement from the
9
Vincer case should be "withdrawn."
In Greiten the majority opinion, written by Justice Heifernan, stated, "[T]he threshold question [with regard to a
cause of action alleging common-law negligence] is not
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous but whether
the defendant exercised ordinary care and whether that lack of
ordinary care was the legal cause of the injuries."'" Justice
Heffernan sought to distinguish a cause of action alleging
common-law negligence from a cause of action based on
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, which was first
adopted in Wisconsin in Dippel v. Sciano." This opinion emphasized that where an action is grounded on negligence alone
it is necessary to show that the defendant somehow failed to
exercise reasonable care. An essential element of this commonlaw negligence cause of action is proof that "the actor as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person should reasonably
have forseen as a consequence of his act that injury would
probably result.' 2 In other words, the plaintiff has to point to
some specific act or omission constituting negligence on the
part of the defendant.
According to the majority opinion in Greiten, the purpose
of adopting the 402A approach was to eliminate the requirement that the plaintiff must show that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care. In order to maintain a cause of action
for strict liability (the 402A approach) "[a]ll plaintiff is required to show is that the product reached the consumer 'in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous' to the user.' 3 The
8. Id. at 274, 238 N.W.2d at 80.
9. Id.
10. 70 Wis. 2d at 604, 235 N.W.2d at 686.
11. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
12. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 2d 223, 234, 234 N.W. 372, 376 (1931).
13. 70 Wis. 2d at 599, 235 N.W.2d at 683-684. This point is further clarified in
footnote 1, 70 Wis. 2d at 600, 235 N.W.2d at 684, where Justice Heffernan emphasized
that the theory of strict liability results in more than a shift of the burden of proof. It
was noted that language in some previous cases seemed to indicate that "[t]he only
effect of strict liability in Wisconsin would be to shift the burden of proof regarding
specific acts of negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant." Justice Heffernan
added, "I do not believe this court intended to so dilute sec. 402A as embodied in the
Dippel holding."
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plaintiff must prove the five elements listed in the Dippel
case,' 4 but it is not necessary to prove that the defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care. One of the five necessary elements
for a cause of action based on the theory of strict liability is that
the product must be "unreasonably dangerous." The issue in
Grieten was whether or not this element must be proved when
the common-law negligence theory is used. As indicated above,
the majority opinion held that the "unreasonably dangerous"
element does not need to be proved, except in a strict liability
cause of action.
The justices who joined in the minority opinion apparently
believed that Dippel not only created a new cause of action,
but that it was also intended to modify the requirements of the
causes of action which were already available to persons who
had been injured by defective products. This opinion, written
by Justice Robert W. Hansen, states that "the preconditions
for plaintiff recovery, laid down in Dippel, apply in a products
liability case whether the claim is one of breach of implied
warranty or a breach of duty to design [i.e., the duty to exercise reasonable care in designing a product]. '"' s The minority
would have required proof that a product is unreasonably dangerous in addition to proof of specific acts of negligence in a
cause of action based on the theory of common-law negligence.
In Heldt v. Nicholson ManufacturihgCo.1sthe court rejected
the appellant's request for the elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" element in a strict liability cause of action. It
was argued that the court should adopt the rule which was
established by the California Supreme Court 7 and recommended by two dissenting justices of the Wisconsin Supreme
14. The five elements are:
(1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the possession or
control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff's
injuries or damages, (4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling such
product or, put negatively, that this is not an isolated or insrequent transaction
not related to the principal business of the seller, and (5) that the product was
one which the seller expected to and did reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition it was when he sold it.
37 Wis. 2d at 460, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
15. 70 Wis. 2d at 596, 235 N.W.2d at 682.
16. 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976).
17. See Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Lugue v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1o63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
See also Glass v. Ford Motor Co. 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973).
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Court in the case of Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum
Swimming Pool Co. 8' Under the proposed rule a jury would be
required to determine whether a product was defective, without being specifically questioned as to whether or not the product was unreasonably dangerous.
The possible reasons for eliminating the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement will not be explored here. However,
this writer believes that the appellant's argument is not without merit. It is unfortunate that the supreme court did not give
more serious attention to this issue.
The breach of implied warranty cause of action, 9 which
frequently arises in products liability cases, was alluded to in
the Greiten v. La Dow case discussed above. In that case the
court may have added confusion to the law relating to the
implied warranty cause of action. The minority opinion stated,
"As had been done earlier in negligence cases, the Dippel holding abolished the requirement of privity of contract in breach
of implied warranty cases." 0 In addition, the majority opinion
included the following statement: "Dippel discusses with great
thoroughness the reason why, in finding that the plaintiff
stated a cause of action, the previous Wisconsin law requiring
privity of contract in an action for a breach of implied warranty
should be abrogated."'" The court in Dippel did not find that
the plaintiff stated a cause of action; the court recognized a
new cause of action (strict liability as described in section 402A
of the Restatement) and allowed the plaintiff to file an
amended complaint which would be based on this new cause
of action. Contrary to the statement quoted above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated that the requirement of privity of contract has not been abrogated for a cause of action
2
based on breach of implied warranty.
Fortunately, it is clear from a subsequent opinion that the
court did not intend to imply that the privity requirement for
a breach of implied warranty cause of action should be removed. In City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder &
Associates23 the court held:
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

69 Wis. 2d at 333, 230 N.W.2d at 799.
See Wis. STAT. § 402.318 (1973).
70 Wis. 2d at 595, 235 N.W.2d at 681.
Id. at 599, 235 N.W.2d at 683.
See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 45p-59, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58-63 (1967).
72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
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There is still a requirement for privity in a cause of action
based on implied warranty. Although Dippel v. Sciano did
recognize a new cause of action for strict liability in tort by
adopting sec. 402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts, it also expressly continued the requirement of privity in an implied
warranty cause of action.24
In the same case the court reaffirmed the rule which permits recovery for property damage in actions based on the
strict liability theory. The plaintiff, City of La Crosse, suffered
property damage and considerable inconvenience as a result of
the inadequacy of a roof which was installed on a school building by the defendants. It appears that the court could have
simply relied on the case of City of Franklin v. Badger Ford
Truck Sales25 as authority for striking down the demurrer
which was directed at the plaintiffs alleged damages. The City
of Franklin case permitted recovery for the harm done to the
defective product itself as well as for harm done to other property associated with the defective product. The same type of
recovery was sought in the City of La Crosse case.
However, in the City of La Crosse case the court elaborated
on the City of Franklin opinion and extended the scope of
recoverable damages in strict liability actions so as to include
"loss of profits." "We are also of the opinion that a strictliability claim for pure economic loss involving only the cost of
repair or replacement of the product itself and loss of profits is
• . . not demurrable."26 Although the court's statement may
have been broader than necessary it is certainly not untenable.
Section 402A of the Restatement indicates that a plaintiff may
be entitled to recovery for property damage caused by a defective product. 21 In addition, the court has previously held that
property damage and loss of profits are recoverable damages in
28
a common-law negligence case.
Howes v. Deere & Co.29 was mentioned above as the case in
24. Id. at 41, 240 N.W.2d at 125 (footnote omitted).
25. 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
26. 72 Wis. 2d at 44, 240 N.W.2d at 127.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides: (1) "One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
28. A. E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764
(1974).
29. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
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which the court corrected the errors of the Greiten decision. In
addition, the court in Howes provided new guidelines for jury
instructions in products liability cases. The plaintiff in Howes
had asked the trial court to submit two sets of questions to the
jury-one relating to the defendant's common law negligence
and the other relating to the defendant's liability under the
theory of strict liability. The trial court held that the case of
Dippel v. Sciano instructed that the plaintiff should have to
elect between these two theories and that only one set of special
verdict questions should go to the jury. The supreme court
stated that this interpretation of Dippel was erroneous, and
held, "We here declare that when two grounds of negligence are
alleged it does not categorically follow that the plaintiff must
always elect between one of the two grounds of negligence for
' 30
submission to the jury.

The court pointed out that in some cases only one set of jury
instructions and special verdict questions would be appropriate. For example, in a case where no evidence has been introduced to show specific acts of negligence, it would be incorrect
to submit questions and instructions pertaining to commonlaw negligence. Similarly, in a case in which there is no attempt to prove the five requirements listed in Dippel, instructions and questions relevant to the strict liability theory would
be out of place.
An amicus curiae brief suggested that the court should decide which set of questions should first be submitted to the jury
in cases where two sets of questions would be appropriate. This
brief urged that a jury should be required to answer questions
concerning common-law negligence before giving consideration
to questions about strict liability. However, the court refused
to adopt such a ruling and postponed any decision on the
3
issue. '

II.

LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND

The most significant case decided this term in the area of
landowners' and occupiers' liability was Antoniewicz v.
Reszcynski. 32 This is the case in which the court declared that
"the distinction between the duty heretofore owed by a land
occupier to licensees and to invitees should be abolished, and
30. Id. at 272, 238 N.W.2d at 79.
31. Id.
32. 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
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: . . the duty of the land occupier [should] be that required
in any negligence action-ordinary care under the circumstances."3 3 The court's ruling was not intended to affect the duty
owed by land occupiers to trespassers.
Most of the court's lengthy opinion was devoted to justifying the change in the law rather than discussing what will
happen as a result of the change. The court first attempted to
explain why the decision to change the law could be made on
the basis of the pleadings, even though the court had stated
only a year earlier, "If a change is to be considered, it should
be on the basis of a record made at trial, where appropriate
motions are made and instructions requested that will trigger
the exercise of the trial judge's decision on the question as it
may apply to a particular case. ' 34 It is obvious that the trial
judge's memorandum opinion in the Antoniewicz case was influential in motivating the court to act in apparent contradiction to its previous opinion.
The majority went on to explain why the distinction between the invitee and licensee classifications should be removed. Numerous opinions from other jurisdictions were cited
in support of the decision to abrogate the distinction between
licensees and invitees. The reasoning of the Wisconsin court
was summarized as follows:
It would appear, therefore, that there is little to commend
the continued use of the categories of licensee or invitee in
respect to the liability of the occupier of property. As we have
noted, the factual distinctions between licensees and invitees
are hazy and the law blurred. There is no reason why one who
invites a guest to a party at his home should have less concern
for that guest's safety than he has for the welfare of an insurance man who may come to the home to deliver a policy. Is
the life or welfare of a friend who comes as a guest to be more
lightly regarded than the life or welfare of a casual business
acquaintance? To state the question is to answer it. There is
no good reason why the business guest should be afforded
greater protection than the social guest. Particularly in Wisconsin, where the economic-benefit theory has been discarded in respect
to invitees, no logical basis for any dichot35
omy remains.
33. Id. at 839, 236 N.W.2d at 2.
34. Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 585, 593-94, 218 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1974).
35. 70 Wis. 2d at 854, 236 N.W.2d at 10.
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The court suggested that there may be good reasons for
continuing to apply different principles in cases involving trespassers. At one point in the opinion it was stated that "the
trespasser's status is entirely different than that of either a
licensee or an invitee, both of whom enter the property with
knowledge and consent of the landowner. ' 3 However, the court
clearly did not rule out the possibility of abrogating the trespasser classification in a future case. This is indicated by the
following language: "Whatever logic there may be for the total
abolition of all classifications of those who come upon land of
another, we are satisfied that the merits of total abolition
should be considered by a common-law court only in a case
involving a trespasser."37
Finally, the court noted that the holding in the case would
be applied only prospectively, except for the case at bar. Thus,
the rule of Antoniewicz is applicable only to causes of action
arising after December 10, 1975.
It is difficult to predict the effect of the Antoniewicz case.
A licensee will no longer have to prove the existence of a "trap,"
a known but concealed danger, or active negligence before he
can establish liability. This should make it easier for a plaintiff
to avoid a nonsuit, or motion to dismiss under the new rules of
civil procedure," but it remains to be seen how much easier it
will be under the new Antoniewicz rule to convince a jury that
a land occupier has been negligent.
It is also difficult to predict how trespasser cases will be
handled by the supreme court in the future. The attractive
nuisance doctrine,39 the recognition of a duty owed to known or
expected trespassers," and perhaps some cases involving dangerous activities4' have already created significant exceptions
to the general rule that no duty is owed to a trespasser. In
addition, the supreme court seems to be reluctant to classify
persons as trespassers. 2 Thus, if the court in a future case
36. Id. at 843, 236 N.W.2d at 4.
37. Id. at 844-45, 236 N.W.2d at 5.
38. Wis. STAT. § 805.14(2) and (3).
39. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Gazinski, 71 Wis. 2d 57, 237 N.W.2d 437 (1976),
discussed infra in notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
40. See Baumgart v. Spierings, 2 Wis. 2d 289, 86 N.W.2d 413 (1957); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 360-61 (4th ed. 1971).
41. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 361 (4th ed. 1971).
42. See, e.g., Reddington v. Beafeaters Tables, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, 240 N.W.2d
363 (1976), discussed infra in notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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extends the Antoniewicz decision so that the duty of ordinary
care under the circumstances becomes the duty owed to trespassers, it might not produce any dramatic change in the law.
The Antoniewicz case, as well as any future case which
might change the duty of care owed to trespassers, can be expected to result in increased reliance on Wisconsin Statutes
section 29.6813 by Wisconsin defense lawyers. This is the statute
which indicates that a land occupier owes no duty to keep his
premises safe to persons who come onto his land for certain
recreational purposes unless the land occupier receives some
compensation from the person who comes onto the land. In
some cases this statute could permit a land occupier to avoid
liability although there may have been a breach of the duty to
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.
McWilliams v. Gazinskil4 was an "attractive nuisance" case
which was commenced by the mother of a four-year-old boy
who drowned in a neighbor's swimming pool. The plaintiff alleged that the owners of the swimming pool were maintaining
an attractive nuisance because the pool was surrounded by a
"basket weave" fence which provided a "natural stepladder"
and because there were two gates to the pool area which were
not locked at the time of the accident. The defendants' demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the trial court.
The supreme court's majority opinion began with a reaffirmation of the five elements which must be pleaded in Wisconsin in order to bring a cause of action based on the attractive
nuisance theory."5 The primary concern of the court was
43. Wis. STAT. § 29.68 (1973).
44. 71 Wis. 2d 57, 237 N.W.2d 437 (1976).
45. The five elements are as follows:
(1) . . . that the . . . [possessor of real estate] maintained, or allowed to
exist, upon his land, an artificial condition which was inherently dangerous to
children being upon his premises;
(2) that he knew or should have known that children trespassed or were
likely to trespass upon his premises;
(3) that he realized or should have realized that the structure erected or the
artificial condition maintained by him was inherently dangerous to children and
involved an unreasonable risk of serious bodily injury or death to them;
(4) that the injured child, because of his youth or tender age, did not
discover the condition or realize the risk involved in going within the area, or in
playing in close proximity to the inherently dangerous condition;
(5) and that safeguards could reasonably have been provided which would
have obviated the inherent danger without materially interfering with the purpose for which the artificial condition was maintained.
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whether the first of the five requirements was present; i.e.,
whether the complaint alleged that the defendant-landowners
had allowed an inherently dangerous, artificial condition to
exist on their property. The majority and the dissenting justices all agreed that a danger which is obvious even to a child
is not an inherent danger. However, the majority declared that
"[w]hether the danger here was obvious to this four-year-old
is a question of fact to be resolved in the trial court."4 The
dissenters, on the other hand, concluded that "this particular
child must have known and appreciated the dangers of this
particular pool." 47 The dissenting justices would have held that
the pool was not inherently dangerous to the deceased child as
a matter of law.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions indicate that the
determinative factor in evaluating whether a condition is inherently dangerous is the obviousness of the danger to the particular child involved. The justices seemed to be linking the
first of the requirements of an attractive nuisance, an inherently dangerous artificial condition, and the third requirement,
that the injured child did not realize the risk presented by the
dangerous condition. The effect of this interpretation is that
the meaning of inherently dangerous is to be determined
subjectively, rather than objectively. A condition which may be
inherently dangerous to one child, may not be considered inherently dangerous to another child. The court was saying that
when a cause of action is based on the attractive nuisance
theory, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the condition
which caused injury to a child was inherently dangerous as to
the particular child who was injured.
An additional aspect of this case, discussed at the end of the
dissenting opinion, should also be noted. Justice Robert W.
Hansen's opinion pointed out that recovery by the plaintiff
could be precluded by section 29.68.48 As stated previously, this
statute provides that a land occupier should not be liable to
persons who are injured while on the land occupier's property
for various recreational purposes, unless the land occupier reId.

at 61-62, 237 N.W.2d at 438-39, citing Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co.,
215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1934).
46. 71 Wis. 2d at 67, 237 N.W.2d at 441.
47. Id. at 73, 237 N.W.2d at 444.
48. WIS. STAT. § 29.68 (1973).
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ceives some "valuable consideration" from the injured person.
In her complaint McWilliams apparently conceded that the
child was on the landowner's property for "water sports,
sightseeing, or recreational purposes," and that the landowner
received no "valuable consideration." Thus, the statute would
provide a strong argument for the defendants in this case. However, this argument must be raised as an affirmative defense,
and it would have been improper to rely on the statute as a
basis for dismissing the complaint at the demurrer stage.
The central issue in Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables, Inc.49
was whether, at the time he was injured, the plaintiff was a
trespasser or a frequenter entitled to maintain a cause of action
based on a violation of the safe place statute." The plaintiff
was an eleven-year-old boy who had been staying with his
mother at a motel. The boy walked to a restaurant which was
adjacent to the motel in order to get a closer look at "the rock
formations, the large Tiki god, colored lights, and bridge"5
which were located on the premises of the restaurant. On his
return to the motel the boy had to cross a driveway. The plaintiff charged that the foliage and displays located on the restaurant property prevented him from seeing a car which was travelling on the driveway. The same foliage and displays were
alleged to have prevented the driver of the car from seeing the
boy. The boy stepped out into the driveway and was injured
when he was struck by the approaching car.
The action commenced subsequent to this accident named
the owner of the restaurant as a defendant and it was alleged
that the foliage and displays at the restaurant constituted a
violation of the safe place statute. The restaurant owner's motion for nonsuit was granted because the trial judge found that
the plaintiff was a trespasser at the time of the accident. The
judge's reasoning was supported by the fact that the restaurant
was not open at the time of the accident.
On appeal, however, the supreme court found that "[a]ll
of this evidence mandates the conclusion that Robert [the
plaintiff] was on the premises at the implied invitation of the
restaurant proprietors. 52 The court emphasized three factors
49.
50.
51.
52.

72 Wis. 2d 119, 240 N.W.2d 363 (1976).
Wis. STAT. § 101.11 (1973).
72 Wis. 2d at 121, 240 N.W.2d at 365.
Id. at 122, 240 N.W.2d at 365.
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which supported its decision: (1) the restaurant had the same
name as the motel and, therefore, a patron of the motel would
expect that he would be welcome on the restaurant premises;
(2) the displays on the premises were specifically intended to
attract people to the restaurant; and (3) the implied invitation
to visit the restaurant continued even though the restaurant
was closed because there was no notice or warning to indicate
that the premises were not open for inspection. In light of these
factors, the court concluded that there was credible evidence
to support a verdict for the plaintiff and, therefore, the trial
3
court had erred in granting the nonsuit1
A more typical safe place action decided this term was
Buerosse v. Dutchland Dairy Restaurants, Inc. 4 In this case
the plaintiff had finished eating dinner at the defendant's restaurant and, as she was leaving, she slipped on a wet spot on
the floor. The plaintiff was able to prevent herself from falling
by grabbing onto a table, but nevertheless she hurt her back.
She noticed that there were bits of lettuce, salad dressing, and
water in the area where she fell. A lawsuit was commenced
against the defendant restaurant owner and at trial seventyfive percent of the causal negligence was apportioned to the
plaintiff; twenty-five percent to the defendant.
On appeal the plaintiff contended that the jury had been
improperly instructed with regard to the issue of whether the
53. At the original trial the jury found that the driver of the car that struck the
plaintiff was not negligent. The trial court granted judgment for the defendant driver,
and the plaintiff did not appeal as to this judgment. The plaintiff's appeal involved
only the nonsuit which had been granted in favor of the defendant restaurant owner.
In the supreme court's original opinion it was ordered that the entire judgment of
the trial court should be vacated. However, in a per curiam opinion issued on rehearing, the court noted that its original order would have the effect of setting aside the
judgment which had been granted in favor of the defendant driver. Therefore, on
rehearing, the court held that the trial court judgment should be valid as between the
plaintiff and the defendant driver because of the doctrine of res judicata.
The court also ruled that the defendant restaurant owner could still maintain an
action seeking contribution from the defendant driver, even though the driver could
not be directly liable to the plaintiff. The nonsuit of the restaurant owner prevented
the issues relating to contribution from being fully litigated at the first trial. Relying
on Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519 (1973), the court concluded
that "a defendant who has not had the opportunity to litigate his contribution claim
and establish the existence of common liability should not be precluded from doing so
by the fact that the other tortfeasor was successful in defending the injured party's
individual and independent claim for damages." Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables,
Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, 125d 243 N.W.2d 401, 403-04 (1976).
54. 72 Wis. 2d 239, 240 N.W.2d 176 (1976).
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defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defective
condition of the floor. The jury was instructed that in order for
the defendant to be found negligent:
[I]t was required that the restaurant owner be warned "either by actual notice of the alleged defect in time to take
reasonable precautions to remedy the situation which caused
the accident, or by constructive notice of the alleged defect
because it had existed for such a length of time before the
incident that the defendant, or its agents, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered it in time to
to remedy the situation which
take reasonable precautions
55
caused the incident.
The plaintiff argued that the jury should have been able to find
that the defendant had sufficient notice even if it could not be
conclusively demonstrated that the debris had been on the
floor for any length of time.
There are two Wisconsin cases that could conceivably support the plaintiff's argument: Steinhorst v. H. C. Prange Co.56
and Strack v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.5 7 In the Strack
case the plaintiff slipped and fell on a prune which was on the
floor of the defendant's grocery store. There was no way of
proving how long the prune had been on the floor prior to the
time of the accident, but the supreme court affirmed the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The court's opinion included the
following language:
[W]e think that in circumstances where there is a reasonable probability that an unsafe condition will occur because of
the nature of the business and the manner in which it is
conducted, then constructive knowledge of the existence of
such an unsafe condition may be charged to the operator and
such constructive notice does not depend upon proof of an
extended period of time within which a shop owner might
have received knowledge of the condition of fact."
Similar language appears in the Steinhorst case" which involved a woman who slipped on some shaving cream on the
floor of the defendant's department store. In these two cases
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 241, 240 N.W.2d at 177.
48 Wis. 2d 679, 180 N.W.2d 525 (1970).
35 Wis. 2d 51, 150 N.W.2d 361 (1967).
Id. at 57-58, 150 N.W.2d at 364.
48 Wis. 2d at 683-84, 180 N.W.2d at 528.
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the court found that owners of self-service operations have a
duty to make frequent inspections when it could be anticipated
that merchandise on display could get on the floor by accident
or by the negligence of shoppers.
However, in Buerosse the court chose to rely on the case of
Shoemaker v. Marc's Big Boy"0 which involved a fact situation
similar to Buerosse. Although Shoemaker was decided after
Strack and Steinhorst, neither of these two cases was mentioned in the Shoemaker decision. Nevertheless, when the
plaintiff in Buerosse sought to have the rule from Strack and
Steinhorst extended so that it could be applied to restaurants
as well as retail stores the court answered that such an extension had already been rejected in the Shoemaker case.'
Since Shoemaker did not mention the earlier cases, it was
not clear that the rule from Strack and Steinhorst was not to
be applied in restaurant situations. However, it now seems
clear from Buerosse that in restaurant cases constructive notice
must be proved by showing that a defective condition existed
for a period of time long enough so that it should have been
discovered. Buerosse indicates that in restaurant cases it is not
sufficient to prove that inadequate inspections had been made;
the plaintiff must prove that the defective condition actually
existed for some length of time, and that it should have been
discovered. Thus, a distinction has now been recognized between the duty owed by restaurants and the duty owed by
retail stores with self-service operations.
The court did not need to recognize this distinction between
restaurants and retail stores in order to decide the Buerosse
case. The court found that the defendant in Buerosse had taken
reasonable precautions to make sure that the floors were kept
clean and, therefore, the defendant should have been able to
escape liability even if the rule from Strack and Steinhorst had
been applied.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's objections to the jury instructions should have been considered to be moot since the jury did
find negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff objected to the jury instruction requiring actual or constructive
knowledge, but the jury presumably did find actual or constructive knowledge because the defendant was found to have
60. 51 Wis. 2d 611, 187 N.W.2d 815 (1971).
61. 72 Wis. 2d at 241, 240 N.W.2d at 177.
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been negligent. The plaintiff's objection to this jury instruction, therefore, seems to be out of place.
In its 1975 term the supreme court held that an educational
institution owes a duty of ordinary care to students not only to
protect them from certain types of negligent actions of other
students, but also to protect them from intentional torts committed by other students which could be anticipated. In
2
Korenak v. Curative Workshop Adult Rehabilitation Center
the plaintiff received serious injuries at a rehabilitation center
when two fellow students, acting in concert, struck the plaintiff's face with a pipe. The injured student alleged that the
defendant rehabilitation center was negligent in admitting the
students that struck the plaintiff, in failing to provide a staff
which could supervise the students adequately, and in failing
to protect the plaintiff from the known violent tendencies of the
other students.
In the case of Stamberger v. Matthaidess13 the court had
held that educational institutions owe a duty of ordinary care
to protect students from the known hazardous conduct of other
students. While extending this principle to intentional torts
committed by a student known to have a propensity for violence, the court attempted to limit the effect of this ruling.
The court did not intend to imply that a person is always required to anticipate the intentional act of others. 4 It also distinguished the Korenak case from previous cases which involved intentional torts committed at business establishments. 5 In those cases the court had recognized a land occupier's duty to exercise reasonable care "to disocver that rotious
acts were being committed or about to be committed, and adequately warn his customers or restrain the attacker."66
The Korenak case recognizes a duty to use reasonable care
to protect persons from intentional acts which could be anticipated, but it is emphasized that this duty will arise only in
special situations. The court pointed out that:
62. 71 Wis. 2d 77, 237 N.W.2d 43 (1976).
63. 37 Wis. 2d 186, 155 N.W.2d 88 (1967).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B, Comment d.
65. See, e.g., Kowalczyk v. Rotter, 63 Wis. 2d 511, 217 N.W.2d 332 (1974) (tavern);
Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 224, 121 N.W.2d 865 (1963) (grocery
store); Weihart v. Piccione, 273 Wis. 448, 78 N.W.2d 757 (1956) (restaurant); Mahar
v. Uihlein, 240 Wis. 469, 67 N.W.2d 506 (1942) (intergalactic starship).
66. 71 Wis. 2d at 81, 237 N.W.2d at 45.
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[T]he student-school relationship is not of the temporary
sort that arises between, for example, a restauranteur and the
customer who happens to be in the establishment when the
disturbance occurs. The student-school relationship is both
more extensive and more extended. It involves many factors,
such as the history of warnings alleged here, which would not
normally arise in the case of a typical business establishment."7
Thus the duty to anticipate intentional torts and to exercise
reasonable care to prevent them from being committed is a
very limited duty. The court implied that a land occupier will
be required to take steps to protect invitees from intentional
torts only when the land occupier has such knowledge as would
cause a reasonable man to foresee that certain specific individuals were likely to commit intentional torts.
The court also held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to
state a cause of action based on a violation of the safe place
statute. First, the court has previously held that a vocational
school does not qualify as a place of employment. 8 Secondly,
intentional acts of third persons are clearly not "conditions"
within the meaning of the statute.6 9 Thus, the court's rejection
of the cause of action was based on the plaintiff's failure to
establish two elements which are necessary to maintain a cause
of action under the statute.
III.

MALPRACTICE

The court again refused to recognize a cause of action for
"wrongful birth" in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital.I In this
case a child who was born with rubella syndrome and her parents brought suit against a hospital and a doctor alleging that
the defendants had been negligent in failing to recognize that
the child's mother had german measles during her pregnancy.
The parents claimed that the mother would have had an abortion if she had been informed of her condition and sought compensation for the cost of raising the afflicted child.
The claims against the hospital were dismissed because the
court found that no duty owed by the hospital or its personnel
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
See Kirchoff v. City of Janesville, 255 Wis. 202, 38 N.W.2d 698 (1949).
See Deaton v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 265 Wis. 349, 61 N.W.2d 552 (1953).
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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had been breached. 7' However, the claims against the doctor
involved more complicated issues. The court first considered
the child's allegation that as a result of the negligence of the
doctor she "was allowed to be born to a wrongful life.

72

This

case 73

which
case was different from the previous Wisconsin
dealt with "wrongful life" because the Dumer child was disabled, retarded, and crippled, whereas in the earlier case the
child was born normal and healthy. The court cited its own
previous decision but relied primarily on a New Jersey case,
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,74 which involved a nearly identical fact
situation. The New Jersey court dismissed the child's cause of
action because it found that damages would be impossible to
measure. The Wisconsin court adopted much of the reasoning
of the Gleitman decision, including the statement, "The infant
plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is
impossible to make such a determination."7 Accordingly, the
Wisconsin court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
child's cause of action.
In considering the parent's cause of action, the majority of
the court rejected the conclusion which had been reached by
the New Jersey court. Instead, the majority turned its attention to the case of Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. 71 In the

Rieck case the parents of a normal healthy child alleged that
the child's mother would have had an abortion if the defendants had made a timely diagnosis of her pregnancy. In that
case the Wisconsin court ordered that the complaint should be
dismissed after it determined that allowing recovery under the
facts presented would be contrary to public policy. The Dumer
case was distinguished from the Rieck case because the child
71. Under these factual allegations, we conclude the hospital did not breach
a duty owed to Carol Dumer. Hospital employees, either nurses or attendants,
are not legally competent nor legally required to make a medical diagnosis
without direction and supervision of a licensed physician. The hospital employees, under the circumstances alleged here, exercised ordinary care and thus
performed the duty owed to the patient-they admitted the patient and called
a doctor.
Id. at 770, 233 N.W.2d at 374.
72. Id. at 771, 233 N.W.2d at 374.
73. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
74. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
75. 69 Wis. 2d at 773, 233 N.W.2d at 375-76, quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.
22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
76. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
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in the former case was born with rubella syndrome, whereas in
the latter case the child was normal. On the basis of this distinction the court held that the public policy reasons cited in
Rieck should not bar recovery, and the parents were allowed to
proceed in their action against the doctor. In the event that the
plaintiffs were successful at trial, it was declared:
Their damages must be limited to those expenses which they
have reasonably and necessarily suffered, and will to a reasonable medical certainty suffer in the future by reason of the
additional medical, hospital and supportive expense occaof the child as contrasted to a norsioned by the deformities
77
mal, healthy child.
One member of the court would have dismissed the parents'
cause of action on the basis of the public policy factors which
were held to be controlling in the Rieck case. 78 These public
policy arguments were accepted by the New Jersey court in the
Gleitman case, the case which had been relied on heavily by
the majority as authority for dismissing the child's cause of
action. In the words of Justice Robert W. Hansen: "[W]here
the majority goes exactly halfway around the track with the
New Jersey court, the writer would go all the way."79 The dissenting justice believed the policy reasons for denying recovery
to the parents of an unwanted healthy child were equally applicable in an action brought by parents of an unwanted deformed child.
IV.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A 1971 amendment to the Wisconsin wrongful death act was
the source of the controversy in Harris v. Kelley."0 The plaintiffs were nondependent adult children whose parents had both
been killed in a car accident. They brought suit against the
driver of the vehicle which collided with their parents' car. The
defendant demurred to the complaint claiming that the 1971
amendment to the wrongful death statute8 1 prevented emancipated, nondependent children from recovering damages for
pecuniary injury resulting from the wrongful death of a parent.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

69 Wis. 2d at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
Id. (R. Hansen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 777, 233 N.W.2d at 378.
70 Wis. 2d 242, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975).
See Wis. STAT. § 895.0(4) (1973).
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The trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant appealed.
Prior to the 1971 amendment the law indicated that only a
"spouse, unemancipated or dependent children, or parents" of
the deceased were entitled to damages for loss of society and
companionship. It was clear, however, that prior to the amendment, emancipated, nondependent children were entitled to
recover pecuniary damages, subject to the $35,000 statutory
limitation. 2 The 1971 amendment, which was intended to
eliminate the $35,000 limitation on pecuniary damages, provided: "Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from
wrongful death, and additional damages not to exceed $5,000
for loss of society and companionship, may be awarded to the
spouse, unemancipated or dependent children or parents of the
deceased.""3 The defendant argued, and the plaintiff conceded,
that if the amended statute is read literally it clearly precludes
emancipated, nondependent children from maintaining an action for pecuniary loss. The plaintiffs contended, however, that
the legislature did not intend such a result and urged the court
to interpret the amended statute in accordance with the legislative intent. The supreme court recognized the importance of
effectuating the intent of the legislature but also recognized
that "when a statute is plain and unambiguous, interpretation
is unnecessary and intentions cannot be imputed to the legislature except those to be gathered from the terms of the statute
itself." 4 The court determined that the statute was not ambiguous and therefore concluded that the statute's literal meaning
should be applied.
The plaintiffs argued that the statute would create an unconstitutional denial of equal protection if the court refused to
interpret the statute so as to allow recovery by nondependent,
emancipated children. According to this argument the literal
wording of the amended statute created an arbitrary and un82. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1969):
(4) Judgment for,damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful death shall

not exceed $35,000. Additional damages not to exceed $5,000 for loss of society
and companionship may be awarded to spouse, unemancipated or dependent
children or parents of deceased. If the decedent leaves a dependent child under
21 years of age, the above maximum limit for pecuniary loss recoverable shall
be increased $2,000 on account of each such child but not exceeding a total
increase of $10,000. . ..
83. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1973).
84. 70 Wis. 2d at 249, 234 N.W.2d at 631.
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reasonable distinction between emancipated, nondependent
children and unemancipated or dependent children. This distinction allegedly caused emancipated, nondependent children
to be denied the equal protection of the law. The court was
faced with this question: "[I]s there a rational reason for allowing dependent adult and unemancipated children to recover
damages for pecuniary injury resulting from the wrongful death
of a parent while denying such a right of recovery to emancipated and nondependent adult children?" 5 The court held that
a rational reason for the distinction did exist since unemancipated and dependent children could be expected to rely heavily
on the financial support provided by a parent. Therefore, the
literal meaning of the statute was held not to be unconstitutional.
In response to the decision in Harris,the legislature enacted
Chapter 166 of the Laws of 1975,18 which reinstated the right
of emancipated nondependent children to recover pecuniary
damages in wrongful death actions. Thus, the Harrisv. Kelley
result will be applied only to actions which arose between July
3, 1971, and March 9, 1976, the effective date of Chapter 166.
However, in June of 1976, the legislature again amended section 895.04(4) in Chapter 287 of the Laws of 1975.87 Apparently,
in this instance, the intent of the legislature was to raise the
maximum recovery for loss of society and companionship from
85. Id. at 251-52, 234 N.W.2d at 632.
86. 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 166:
895.04(4) of the statutes is amended to read:
895.04(4) Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful death
may be awarded to any person entitled to bring a wrongful death action. Additional damages not to exceed $5,000 for loss of society and companionship, may
be awarded to the spouse, unemancipated or dependent children or parents of
the deceased.
87. 175 Wis. Laws, ch. 287.
895.04(4) and (5) of the statutes are amended to read:
895.04(4) Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from wrongful death,
and additional damages not to exceed $10,000 for loss of society and companionship, may be awarded to the spouse or unemancipated or dependent children,
or parents of the deceased.
(5) If the personal representative brings the action, he may also recover the
reasonable cost of medical expenses, funeral expenses, including the reasonable
cost of a cemetery lot, grave marker and perpetual care of the lot. If a relative
brings the action, he may recover such medical expenses, funeral expenses,
including the cost of a cemetery lot, grave marker and perpetual care of the lot,
on behalf of himself or of any person who has paid or assumed liability for such
expenses.
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$5,000 to $10,000. Unfortunately, the legislature used the language of the 1971 amendment which had been held in Harris
to deny nondependent children a cause of action for pecuniary
loss.
Thus, on June 2, 1976, Wisconsin apparently had two conflicting statutes dealing with recovery of damages in wrongful
death cases. One statute, created by Chapter 166, would permit a nondependent adult child to recover pecuniary damages
in the wrongful death of his parent while the other statute,
created by Chapter 287, would prohibit such a recovery. Finally
on June 30, 1976, section 152, Chapter 422, Laws of 1975, went
into effect affirming the fact that "both amendments stand.",,
The holding in Harris raises an interesting issue in cases
arising during the period of July 31, 1971, to March 9, 1976:
should a dependent child be limited in his recovery for pecuniary loss to the years during which he remains dependent or
unemancipated? For example, if a child is sixteen years old at
the time of his father's death, should he be allowed recovery for
pecuniary loss only until the age of nondependency? The
Harris rationale could indicate that nondependency is the
point at which a minor child's damages should be cut off.
Whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court will adopt this reasoning remains to be seen.
The holding in Harrisalso raised the issue of whether brothers and sisters are entitled to maintain a cause of action for
wrongful death under the statute as it existed after the 1971
amendment. This question arises because of an inconsistency
in the 1971 versions of sections 895.04(2) and 895.04(4). While
section 895.04(2) states that brothers and sisters may be entitled to maintain a wrongful death action, they are omitted from
the list of persons entitled to recovery under section 895.04(4) .
The court resolved this inconsistency in Rabe v. Outagamie
County9" where it held that the sister of a decendent could not
88. 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 422, § 152: "The Amendment of 895.04(4) of the statutes
by chapter 166, laws of 1975, was not repealed by chapter 287, laws of 1975. Both
amendments stand."
89. Compare subsection (2) and subsection (4) of Wis. STAT. § 895.04 (1973).
Subsection (2) indicates that there may be circumstances under which "lineal heirs"
or brothers and sisters can maintain a wrongful death action, and yet under subsection
(4), as interpreted by the court in the Harris case, only spouses and unemancipated
or dependent children are entitled to recover damages.
90. 72 Wis. 2d 492, 502, 241 N.W.2d 428, 433-34 (1976). To say that the court
"resolved" the inconsistency is somewhat inaccurate. Actually, the court simply ruled
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bring a cause of an action for wrongful death under the statute
as amended in 1971.
Rabe v. Outagamie County also illustrates the importance
of following all relevant statutory procedures carefully when an
action is brought against a governmental agency. In Rabe the
plaintiff's decendent, an employee of the Town of Center, Wisconsin, was assisting two employees of the Outagamie County
Highway Department in removing tree stumps from the roadway.' One of the stumps rolled off of the bed of the truck,
struck the deceased, and caused fatal injuries. A sister of the
deceased, acting as his representative, brought suit against the
county. The county was unsuccessful in its demurrer to the
complaint, but part of the trial court's order was reversed on
appeal.
The first of two errors made by the plaintiff was a failure
to give a "notice of injury" as required by Wisconsin Statutes
section 895.43.92 In the words of the court, this statute requires
that "[w]here employees of a county or other governmental
agency commit injury through negligence, a claimant must
generally either undertake a timely notice procedure of such
fact or establish that the governmental unit had actual notice
and was not prejudiced by the lack of formal notice. 9 3 The
plaintiff in Rabe claimed that the notice requirements of secwithout discussion that a sister is not entitled to maintain a wrongful death action
during the time when the 1971 amendment was effective.
91. Id. at 494, 241 N.W.2d at 430.
92. Wis. STAT. § 895.43(1) (1973):
895.43 Tort actions against political corporations, governmental subdivisions or agencies and officers, agents or employes; notice of injury; limitation of damages and suits. (1) No action founded on tort, except as provided
in s. 345.05, shall be maintained against any volunteer fire company organized
under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency thereof
nor against any officer, official, agent or employe of such corporation, subdivision or agency for acts done in their official capacity or in the course of their
agency or employment unless within 120 days after the happening of the event
causing the injury or damage or death complained of, written notice of the time,
place and circumstances of the injury or damage signed by the party, his agent
or attorney is served on such volunteer fire company, political corporation,
governmental subdivision or agency and on the officer, official, agent or employe
under s. 262.06. Failure to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the
claim if the fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice
of the damage or injury, and the injured party shows to the satisfaction of the
court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency or to the
defendant officer, official, agent or employe ....
93. 72 Wis. 2d at 497, 241 N.W.2d at 431.
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tion 895.43 were not applicable since the accident in the case
involved a motor vehicle. It was correctly argued that an exception to section 895.43 does arise in cases involving motor vehicles because of the provisions of Wisconsin Statutes section
345.05.14 This section does not include the stringent notice requirements found in section 895.43. However, the special notice
requirements contemplated in section 345.05 are applicable
only when an accident arises out of the "negligent operation of
a motor vehicle." The court in Rabe held that section 345.05
does not apply to loading activities associated with motor vehicles: "We think sec. 345.05 is applicable when the injury can
be traced to incidents of vehicle operation on the highway
94. Wis.

STAT.

§ 345.05 (1973):

(2) Any of the following may file a claim for damages against the state or
municipality concerned and the governing body thereof may allow, compromise,
settle and pay the same:
(a) A person suffering any damage proximately resulting from the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle owned and operated by the state or a municipality,
which damage was occasioned by the operation of such motor vehicle in the
course of its business. For the purposes of this subsection, a motor vehicle shall
be deemed owned and operated by the state or a municipality if such vehicle is
either being rented or leased, or is being purchased under a contract whereby
the state or municipality will acquire title.
(b) A person suffering any damage proximately resulting from the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the state through the agency
of the Wisconsin national guard, the Wisconsin air national guard or the members or employes thereof when on state duty and whether paid from state or
federal funds and which damage was occasioned by the operation of such motor
vehicle in the performance of its business.
(3) The manner and form of and the place for filing claims shall be:
(b) If against any county, as provided in ss. 59.76 and 59.77(1), with the
county clerk.
(4) Failure of the governing body to pass upon the claim within 90 days
after presentation constitutes a disallowance. Disallowance by the governing
body bars any action founded on the claim unless brought within 6 months after
disallowance. Actions against the state and payment of the amount recovered
shall be as provided in ss. 285.01 and 285.04. For the purposes of this section,
judgments against municipalities shall be certified, filed and collected as provided in s. 66.09 whether named therein or not.
(5) If the allowance of claim is by or the judgment is against any municipality lying in more than one town, city, village or county, the governing body of
the debtor municipality shall prorate the amount of the claim allowed or the
judgment and so certify to the proper officials for tax levy, so that the taxable
property of the debtor municipality will equitably bear the amount of the claim
or judgment.
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rather than any collateral use such as loading."95 Thus, the
court concluded that the plaintiff should have complied with
the notice requirements of section 895.43.
The court did not conclude, however, that this failure to
comply with the notice requirements should be grounds for
dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action against the county.
Relying on the case of Majerus v. Milwaukee County,"5 the
court held that "compliance with sec. 895.43 is a 'condition in
fact requisite to liability,' but it is not a condition required for
stating a cause of action."97 In other words, the court held that
the county's objections to the alleged failure to comply with the
notice requirements should have been raised by affirmative
defense rather than by demurrer.
The second mistake made by the plaintiff resulted in the
dismissal of the cause of action against Outagamie County.
The plaintiff did not comply with Wisconsin Statutes section
59.76 1 which requires that a person making a claim against a
county must present his claim to the county board. The statute
further requires that "no action shall be brought or maintained
against a county" until after the claim has been either consented to or "disallowed" by the county board. A county board
could approve a claim and eliminate the need to proceed with
an action. On the other hand, the board can "disallow" a claim
either expressly or by failing to consent to the claim "before the
95. 72 Wis. 2d at 497, 241 N.W.2d at 431.
96. 39 Wis. 2d 311, 159 N.W.2d 86 (1968).
97. 72 Wis. 2d at 498, 241 N.W.2d at 432.
98. Wis. STAT. §§ 59.76(1) and (2) (1973):
Claims against counties; actions on; disallowance. (1) No action shall be
brought or maintained against a county upon any account, demand or cause of
action when the only relief demandable is a judgment for money, except upon
a county order, unless the county board shall consent and agree to the institution of such action, or unless such claim shall have been duly presented to such
board and they shall have failed to act upon the same within the time fixed by
law. No action shall be brought upon any county order until the expiration of
thirty days after a demand for the payment thereof has been made; and if an
action is brought without such demand and the defendant fails to appear and
no proof of such demand is made, the court or the clerk thereof shall not permit
judgment to be entered, and if judgment is entered it shall be absolutely void.
(2) The decision of the county board disallowing in whole or in part any
claim of any person shall be final and a bar to any action founded thereon,
except as provided in subsection (1), unless an action be brought to recover
against the county within six months after such disallowance. Failure to allow
a claim before the adjournment of the next annual session of the board after the
claim is filed shall be deemed a disallowance.
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adjournment of the next annual session of the board after the
claim is filed.""5
In Rabe the plaintiff correctly filed a claim with the county
board but she failed to comply with the statute because she
commenced an action before the claim had been consented to
or disallowed by the board. In a previous case, Maynard v. De
Vries,' the court found that failure to comply with section
59.76 meant that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.
This precedent was followed in Rabe and the cause of action
against the county was dismissed.
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

In the case of Barth v. Downey Co.,10' the court ruled that
an employee of a subcontractor must allege and demonstrate
affirmative acts of negligence before a general contractor can
be liable for injuries suffered by the subcontractor's employee.
An action brought by a subcontractor's employee against a
general contractor was equated with an employee's action
against a corporate officer."' The court stated, "Liability of a
general contractor to the employee of a subcontractor, like the
liability of a corporate officer as a coemployee, would have to
depend or derive from 'affirmative acts' of negligence.""1 3
The analogy to employee suits against corporate officers
may be unnecessarily confusing. The duty which a general contractor owes to an employee of a subcontractor is not the same
as the duty owed to the employee by his employer. Thus the
court is correct in saying that the general contractor will not
be liable to a subcontractor's employee for the breach of a duty
which is owed only by the employer. In this respect it would
be necessary to show that the general contractor did something
extra-something beyond a breach of a duty owed only by an
employer.
However, the general contractor owes a duty to an employee
of a subcontractor which is the same as the duty owed to the
99. Wis. STAT. § 59.76(2) (1973).
100. 224 Wis. 224, 272 N.W. 27 (1937).
101. 71 Wis. 2d 775, 239 N.W.2d 92 (1976).
102. See Kruse v. Schieve, 61 Wis. 2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973). For recent cases
reaffirming the general principles relating to the liability of corporate officers see also
Kruse v. Schieve, 72 Wis.2d 126, 240 N.W.2d 159 (1976); Crawford v. Dickman, 72 Wis.
2d 151, 240 N.W.2d 165 (1976).
103. 71 Wis. 2d 775, at 783, 23 N.W.2d at 96.
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general public. From this perspective it may be misleading to
say that something extra is needed. The general contractor
owes a duty to the public to exercise ordinary care, and the
same duty is owed to an employee of a subcontractor. If the
general contractor's duty to the public can be described as a
duty to avoid affirmative acts of negligence which would increase the risk of injury, then this is also a proper description
of the duty owed to an employee of a subcontractor. Normally,
however, the duty owed to the public is described as a duty to
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, and this same
duty is owed to the employee of a subcontractor. If the general
contractor's work exposed the public to a dangerous condition,
and he did not give proper warnings, then the contractor might
be liable to a member of the public who was injured as a result
of the dangerous condition. The same would be true if an employee of a subcontractor was not warned and was injured by
the dangerous condition.
In Hoeft v. Friedel °4 the supreme court clarified Wisconsin
law regarding the assignment of negligence to a person who is
teaching another person to drive. While the plaintiff was teaching the defendant, his friend, how to drive, the car in which
they were riding was involved in a head-on collision. The plaintiff, Hoeft, suffered serious injuries and commenced suit. At
trial, the jury assigned the causal negligence as follows: five
percent to passenger-instructor Hoeft, fifteen percent to
student-driver Friedel, and eighty percent to the driver of the
other car.
On appeal, the supreme court found that the trial judge had
acted properly with regard to the application of the emergency
doctrine, but held that the judge had committed error with
regard to the instructions given to the jury concerning the negligence of the plaintiff. The court found that the appellant's
argument for attributing negligence to the plaintiff was actually based on two distinct theories which the appellants had
erroneously combined into one.
The first theory for attributing negligence to the plaintiff
was based on principles of agency. If the driver could be considered to be the agent of the passenger, then the driver's negligence could be imputed to the passenger. 0 5 The court stated
104. 70 Wis. 2d 1022, 235 N.W.2d 918 (1975).
105. The court's opinion included the following dicta: "Appellants correctly state
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that a jury could find that the driver was the agent of the
passenger, regardless of whether the car was owned by the passenger, if the jury found that: "(1) There is some agreement by
the driver to act on the other's behalf or for his benefit; (2)
some benefit results to the other party; and (3) the other party
retains the right to control the driver and direct him in the
accomplishment of his purpose."'' 6 At the time of the accident
in the Hoeft case, the car was being used primarily for the
purpose of giving practice and experience to the student driver.
However, the facts from the trial indicated that the driver and
the passenger were returning from a visit to a friend of the
passenger. Thus, the court concluded that the three elements
listed above may have been present, and it would have been
proper to have the jury determine whether the driver was acting as an agent of the passenger at the time of the accident. If
the jury found that such an agency existed, then the negligence
of the driver would be imputed to the passenger.
A second theory by which negligence could be attributed to
the passenger-plaintiff arises from the fact that the passenger
was acting as an instructor to a student driver. When a student
driver is operating a car, a passenger who is acting as a teacher
has a duty not only to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety, but in addition the passenger has "an independant duty
to supervise and control the automobile. .

.

. [This duty]

arises from the plaintiff's [passenger's] agreement as an experienced driver, to instruct and supervise an inexperienced
driver and is required by statute for the protection of third
persons on the highway."'' ° The court noted that a breach of
this additional duty would probably constitute active rather
than passive negligence; that is, negligence which is not only a
cause of the plaintiff's own injuries but also a cause of the
collision.
Since the first of the above-discussed theories for attributthe rule in this state that the driver of a motor vehicle is presumed to be the agent.
Where this presumption is not rebutted, the rules of agency dictate that the driver's
negligence be imputed to the owner." Id. at 1033, 235 N.W.2d at 923 (footnote omitted). This language is not original. However, the use of this language in this case,
where the car owner's only connection to the accident was the fact of ownership, may
suggest to plaintiff's lawyers that it should become routine practice to name car owners
as defendants in automobile accident cases.
106. 70 Wis. 2d at 1034-35, 235 N.W.2d at 924.
107. Id. at 1036, 235 N.W.2d at 925.
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ing negligence to the plaintiff, the agency theory, was not specifically argued by the appellants, the case was remanded on
the basis of the second theory. At the new trial the jury was to
be asked to consider whether the plaintiff-passenger "exercised
due care in the supervision and control" of the vehicle and the
student driver's operation of the vehicle." 8
One of the issues in Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transport Corp.0 concerned the reduction of a spouse's collateral cause of action for loss of consortium and for personal
services rendered. After stepping off a bus owned and operated
by the defendant, Mr. Victorson slipped beneath its wheels and
the bus ran over his leg causing serious injuries. Victorson's
wife was also named as a plaintiff, as a collateral claimant, in
the action which was commenced after this accident. Mr. Victorson suffered a stroke and died prior to trial, but the lawsuit
was continued. The jury apportioned thirty-five percent of the
causal negligence to Mr. Victorson and the remaining sixty-five
percent to the defendant bus company. The jury also found
that Mrs. Victorson should be awarded $15,000 for loss of consortium and $5,000 for the personal services which she rendered
to her husband after the accident.
In a motion after verdict the defendant requested that the
trial court judge reduce the damages awarded to the wife by the
percentage of negligence which had been assigned to her husband. The case was apparently tried before the supreme court
handed down its opinion in White v. Lunder"0 and, therefore,
the trial court relied on Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee", as
authority for denying the defendant's motion.
The Schwartz opinion contained the following language:
"Since the cause of action for consortium occasioned by an
108. Id. at 1038, 235 N.W.2d at 926. Unfortunately, the court did not specifically
indicate whether or not the agency issue should be reconsidered at the new trial. If, at
a new trial, an agency question is submitted to the jury and an agency relationship is
found to have existed, then negligence could conceivably be attributed to the plaintiff
from two sources. He could be found negligent for his own failure to exercise due care
in the supervision and control of the vehicle, and, in addition, the negligence of the
driver, Friedel, could be imputed to him. A new jury could apportion negligence as
follows: plaintiff-30%, Friedel (the student driver)-30%, and the driver of the other
vehicle-40%. If this did happen, then the plaintiff would be barred from recovery even
though his own negligence taken by itself, and the driver's negligence, taken by itself,
would each be less than the negligence of the driver of the other vehicle.
109. 70 Wis. 2d 336, 234 N.W.2d 332 (1975).
110. 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).
111. 54 Wis. 2d 286, 195 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
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injury to the other spouse is
never belonged to the other
defenses which are available
of action." 11 2 This position
when the court ruled:

a separate cause of action which
spouse, it is not subject to the
against the other spouse's cause
was modified in the White case

We deem it appropriate to declare, for the purpose of applying our comparative negligence statute, that both the causes
of action for medical expenses and loss of consortium shall be
deemed derivative; and that the causal negligence of the injured spouse shall bar or limit the recovery of the claiming
spouse pursuant to the terms of the comparative negligence
statute."'
The White decision dictated that the wife's cause of action
should be "deemed derivative" for the purpose of applying the
comparative negligence statute. This meant that the damages
awarded to the wife in the Victorson case should be reduced by
the percentage of negligence assigned to her husband. Thus,
the Victorson case provided a relatively simple example of how
the Schwartz decision was modified by White v. Lunder.
Finally, it should be noted that the court extended the rule
of the White case by holding that awards for personal services
rendered by the collateral claimant could be barred or reduced
because of the contributory negligence of the injured spouse.
The White case involved only claims for loss of consortium and
medical expenses.
Plaintiffs seeking damages for alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of process were denied recovery in Thompson
v. Beecham." 4 The case, which presented a rather uncommon
fact situation, stemmed from a dispute between two church
members on one side and the church and its minister on the
other side. In a previous action the church had sought to enjoin
the two members from interfering with church activities. In a
counterclaim to that action the two members sought to dissolve
the church and remove the minister from his position. The
earlier actions were dropped after the parties reached a compromise agreement. Subsequent to this settlement, however,
112. 70 Wis. 2d at 359, 234 N.W.2d at 343, quoting Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee,
54 Wis. 2d 286, 293, 195 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1972).
113. 70 Wis. 2d at 359, 234 N.W.2d at 343, quoting White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d
563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975).
114. 72 Wis. 2d 356, 241 N.W.2d 163 (1976).
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the two members, previously the defendants, commenced an
action against the chairman of the church and the minister,
previously the plaintiffs, alleging that the earlier action constituted malicious prosecution and an abuse of process.
The malicious prosecution action was quickly dismissed on
the basis of two precedents which dictated that (1) an action
for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained unless the original action was terminated in favor of the party alleging malicious prosecution" 5 and (2) a voluntary compromise agreement
in the original prosecution does not constitute the required
"favorable termination.""' In Thompson the settlement of the
earlier action was held not to be a termination in favor of the
party alleging malicious prosecution and, therefore, one of the
prerequisites for maintaining such a suit was not present.
The abuse of process action evoked more substantial analysis. The court initially quoted Prosser regarding the two elements which must be present in an abuse of process action:
"[F]irst, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the
use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."" 7 The court focused its attention on the second element
and concluded that this was not present in the Thompson case.
The court did provide some discussion of the requirement of a
"definite act or threat not authorized by the process," but unfortunately this discussion was theoretical and did not offer
many concrete examples. An attorney is not given a great deal
of assistance when the court speaks in terms as vague as the
115. Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 257 Wis. 228, 43 N.W.2d 244 (1950). This case
lists six essential elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution:
1. There must have been a prior institution or continuation of some regular
judicial proceedings against the plaintiff in this action for malicious prosecution.
2. Such former proceedings must have been by, or at the instance of, the
defendant in this action for malicious prosecution.
3. The former proceedings must have terminated in favor of the defendant
therein, the plaintiff in the action for malicious prosecution.
4. There must have been malice in instituting the former proceedings.
5. There must have been want of probable cause for the institution of the
former proceedings.
6. There must have been injury or damage resulting to the plaintiff from
the former proceedings.
Id. at 231, 43 N.W.2d 246. The third of the above listed elements is the one on which
the court focused its attention in the Thompson case.
116. Lechner v. Ebenreiter, 235 Wis. 244, 292 N.W. 913 (1940).
117. 72 Wis. 2d at 362, 241 N.W.2d at 166, quoting W. PROSSEa, LAW OF TORTS §
121, at 857-58 (4th ed. 1971).
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following: "The plaintiff must allege and prove that something
was done under the process which was not warranted by its
terms. The existence of an improper purpose alone is not
enough, for this improper purpose must also culminate in an
actual misuse of the process to obtain some ulterior advantage." ' 8 Despite the possible problems with assessing a specific
set of facts in light of this kind of language, an attorney handling a case in which there may be an abuse of process should
consult the Thompson case. Malicious prosecution and abuse
of process actions appear to be arising more frequently, so the
court should have opportunities to elaborate on the requirements for these actions in the future.
PAUL M. LOHMANN
118. 72 Wis. 2d at 363, 241 N.W.2d at 166.

